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EGISLATIVE action took center stage in the area of commercial
transactions during this Survey period. In its 1999 legislative ses-
sion, the Texas Legislature not only resuscitated the revised article
5 on letters of credit that failed to pass in the 1997 session, but also be-
came one of the first jurisdictions to enact the revised article 9 on secured
transactions.' This Article not only includes the traditional discussion of
selected cases decided during the Survey period, but also includes a sum-
mary (albeit brief) of important changes made by the 1999 legislative
revisions.2
I. DEFINITIONS & GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. "CONSPICUOUS"
As illustrated by Douglas Cablevision IV, L.P. v. Southwestern Electric
Power Co.,3 the Texas Business and Commerce Code ("Code") definition
of "conspicuous" has become firmly entrenched in the general Texas law
of contracts. In Douglas, an employee of a house-moving company suf-
* Professor of Law and Foundation Professor of Commercial Law, Texas Tech Uni-
versity. B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University.
1. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
approved a revision of the Official Text of article 5 in 1995. See U.C.C. §§ 5-101 to 9-117
(1995). The revision won a majority vote in both the House and Senate during the 1997
legislative session, but unexpectedly failed to win passage because of a point of order
raised by Representative Wohlgemuth on May 30, 1997. See H.J. OF TEX., 75th Leg., R.S.
3809-10 (1997). This point of order prevented final passage of some fifty-two bills, includ-
ing article 5, and occurred too late in the session to be remedied. The revised article 5 was
reintroduced in the 1999 legislative session and won final approval with an effective date of
September 1, 1999. See Act of April 7, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 4, § 1, 1999 Tex. Gen.
Laws 7.
NCCUSL approved a complete revision of article 9 in 1998. See U.C.C. §§ 9-101 to 9-708
(1995). The revised article 9 was passed in Texas during the 1999 legislative session with an
effective date of July 1, 2001. See Act of June 18, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 1.01, 1999
Tex. Gen. Laws 2639. The other states approving the revised article 9 during their 1999
legislative sessions were Arizona, California, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, and Nevada.
All of these jurisdictions used the date of July 1, 2001 to conform to the uniform effective
date proposed by NCCUSL. See U.C.C. § 9-701 (1995); Act of June 18, 1999, 76th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 414, § 3.01, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2747.
2. As enacted in Texas, the Uniform Commercial Code is contained in the first eleven
chapters of the Texas Business and Commerce Code (the "Code"). See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1999). The Uniform Commercial Code
Official Text uses the term "article" to refer to the various subject matters it covers; the
Texas enactment uses the term "chapter" instead. Thus, "article 5: Letters of Credit" in the
Official Text becomes "chapter 5: Letters of Credit" in the Texas Code.
3. 992 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied).
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fered serious injuries from electric shock when a television cablewire at-
tached to a power company utility pole came into contact with an electric
power line attached to the same pole. The power company and the cable
company both settled with the injured employee, but the power company
sought indemnity from the cable company under the terms of a contract
that required the cable company to indemnify the power company for any
damage caused by its negligent acts or omissions.4 The court noted that
the indemnity clause, while sufficient to meet the "express negligence
doctrine," 5 failed to meet the requirement that it also be "conspicuous." '6
In applying the Code standard, the court noted that the operative lan-
guage in the indemnity clause was "contained in two sentences spanning
roughly one half page of a thirteen-page document."' 7 The court further
noted that the clause was not titled with a descriptive heading and was
not designed to "draw the attention of a reasonable person" to it.8 The
court held that, as a matter of law the indemnity provision was not con-
spicuous and was, therefore, unenforceable. 9 The court also rejected an
argument by the power company that the Code definition applies only to
form contracts and opined that the definition should apply to "any docu-
ment which contains a risk-shifting clause, regardless of whether the doc-
ument is original, preprinted, computer-generated, or used without
substantial changes for numerous parties." 10 Even assuming, however,
that the Code definition did apply only to form contracts, the contract in
question contained blanks for the insertion of dates, names, and pole lo-
cations and, in the view of the court, was a form contract.' Although the
discussion by the court regarding application of the Code definition of
''conspicuous" to contracts of all types is merely an alternative analysis of
the contract in question, this may be the most important part of the opin-
ion for the contract drafter. Coupled with its remarks about the lack of
4. The contract between the power company and the cable company was a lease
agreement permitting the cable company to attach television cables to designated power
company utility poles as part of the cable company's television distribution system.
5. Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Const. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 707-08 (Tex. 1987). The express
negligence doctrine requires that a party seeking indemnity from the consequences of its
own negligence express this intent in specific terms contained within the contract between
the parties.
6. In Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Tex. 1993), the
court held that the definition of "conspicuous" contained in § 1.201(10) of the Code would
be used as the standard against which contract terms of all types would be measured, re-
gardless of whether the contract was otherwise one specifically covered by the Code. In
Dresser, the court also held that whether a clause is conspicuous is a question of law for the
court.
7. Douglas Cablevision, 992 S.W.2d at 509.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 510.
10. Id. at 507. Form contracts, such as insurance contracts or preprinted sales con-
tracts, are also known as "contracts of adhesion." See, e.g., Frederick Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943);
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DEcIDING APPEALS, 362-71
(1960); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1176-77 (1983).
11. See Douglas Cablevision, 992 S.W.2d at 508.
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descriptive titles and the non-distinctive nature of the type font used for
the indemnity clause, Douglas indicates that a cautious drafter should
make a serious effort to include paragraph or section titles and bold-faced
type whether or not the contract is one that would be considered a classic
form contract. In this day of word-processing software and an almost
infinite variety of type styles, Douglas may forewarn a more stringent
attitude toward reviewing contracts for "conspicuous" terms.
B. "GOOD FAITH"
Litigation surrounding the issue of good faith continued unabated dur-
ing the Survey period. In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas,
Inc.,12 the court held that contract formation or termination is distinct
from contract modification and, therefore, is not within the Code's re-
quirement that modifications be made in good faith.13 The court rea-
soned that an agreement between the parties to terminate contracts for
the purchase of natural gas, together with a release of all mutual liabilities
between the parties; was not a modification of the prior contracts but was
instead the formation of a new contract that did not involve the perform-
ance or enforcement of an existing contract to which the Code obligation
of good faith applied.14 Based on this distinction between termination
and, modification, the court reversed the lower court decision applying a
good faith standard to the termination agreements and entered judgment
that the terminations released the buyer from any further liability to the
sellers under the gas purchase contracts.' 5 The court added, however,
that even though the standard of good faith did not apply to contract
formation, the conduct of a party in the formation of a contract was still
subject to the Code doctrine of unconscionability. 16
Acceleration and foreclosure actions have been a fertile source for
claims by debtors asserting a lack of good faith on the part of creditors.' 7
12. 8 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. Nov. 18, 1999, pet. filed).
13. See id. at 313-14.
14. See id. Good faith is defined in section 1.201(19) as "honesty in fact in the conduct
or transaction concerned." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(19) (Vernon 1994). Sec-
tion 1.203 provides, "Every contract or duty within this title imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement." Id. § 1.203. The comments to § 2.209 state, in
pertinent part, that "modifications . . must meet the test of good faith imposed by this Act.
The effective use of bad faith to escape performance on the original contract terms is
barred, and the extortion of a 'modification' without legitimate commercial reason is inef-
fective as a violation of the duty of good faith." Id. § 2.209 cmt. 2.
15. See El Paso Natural Gas, 8 S.W.3d at 312. The lower court decision was reported
at 964 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. granted) and was described in last year's
Survey. See John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 52 SMU L. REV. 813, 816 (1999).
16. See 8 S.W.3d at 312. As to one of the releases an issue of unconscionability was
raised but the court found that it was unnecessary to decide that issue. See id. at 313.
17. See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706, 708-09 (Tex. 1990) (stating that
good faith is required only if there is a "special relationship" between the parties; ordinary
debtor-creditor transactions do not create a special relationship); Nance v. R.T.C., 803
S.W.2d 323 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990), writ denied per curium, 813 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.
1991) (where no special relationship between debtor and creditor existed); Pack v. First
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Tyler, 828 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, no writ)
2000]
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In Commercial National Bank v. Batchelor,1 8 a bank accelerated the bal-
ance due on a series of loans after the debtor defaulted. The bank re-
fused to renegotiate or renew the loans and told the debtor that he could
sell the property securing the loans to a buyer who had expressed an in-
terest in buying the property or face foreclosure proceedings. The bank
did not disclose that it had already obtained an appraisal of the property.
The debtor chose to sell the property himself and the sale proceeds were
credited to the amount of the outstanding debt. The bank subsequently
sued for the deficiency. The debtor contended that the bank had not ac-
ted in good faith by refusing to renegotiate or renew the loans and by
failing to disclose its knowledge of the appraised value of the property.
The jury found in the debtor's favor on the issue of good faith and based
on this finding, the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment against
the bank.
On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's decision because the ac-
tions of the bank did not support a conclusion that it had failed to act in
good faith. The appellate court ruled that the contract between the par-
ties did not establish any duty on the part of the bank to disclose its pri-
vate appraisals, nor did it create a fiduciary relationship with the debtor.
Furthermore, there was no contractual obligation requiring the bank to
renegotiate or renew the loans. The court rendered judgment in favor of
the bank because there was no evidence to support the jury finding of a
lack of good faith.' 9
In Meadowbrook Gardens, Ltd. v. WMFMT Real Estate Limited Part-
nership,20 the court held that the creditor had given proper notice of an
intent to accelerate and that subsequent notice of foreclosure by trustee's
sale was effective as a notice of the acceleration itself. The court further
held that the creditor had not violated the express terms of the note and
deed of trust permitting the debtor to pay any past due installment prior
to the due date of the next installment by scheduling a foreclosure sale
before the next due date where the debtor had been in default for more
than three years. The express terms of the note and deed of trust dealt
only with payment of past due installments; it did not address when the
debtor would be required to pay the entire balance due following acceler-
ation. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the creditor.21
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Under the Code statute of frauds provision, a contract for the sale of
goods is enforceable if there is a minimal writing stating a quantity and
(holding that the duty of good faith was fulfilled by creditor who disclosed knowledge
about contract to sell property to another purchaser).
18. 980 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
19. See id. at 754.
20. 980 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied).
21. See id. at 919.
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signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. 22 Even if no
writing exists, the statute may be satisfied if the alleged contract falls
within one of the statutory exceptions.23 In Flameout Design &
Fabrication, Inc.,24 the court held that a letter of intent, even when read
together with a parts list and a cover letter, did not satisfy the statute
because the writings failed to indicate the existence of an agreement be-
tween the parties.25 The seller also failed to establish an equitable estop-
pel because there was no showing beyond a conclusory statement that the
buyer had made any false representation of a material fact.26 The seller
was more fortunate in Posey v. Broughton Farm Co.27 where, although
the agreement was admittedly only an oral understanding, the buyer, act-
ing through an agent, had taken delivery of warehouse receipts. By vir-
tue of this delivery, the court held that the seller met the part
performance exception to the statute of frauds for the quantity of goods
represented by the warehouse receipts. 28 An interesting twist to this
case, however, is that the seller's action was against the agent and not
against the actual buyer because the agent did not disclose that she was
acting for an undisclosed principal when she accepted the warehouse re-
ceipts. The agent attempted to avoid liability on the ground that disclo-
sure of her agency capacity occurred when she paid for the warehouse
receipts with drafts drawn against the account of her principal. The court
properly recognized that this disclosure came too late since the contract
became enforceable under the part performance exception to the statute
of frauds as soon as the warehouse receipts were delivered; at that point,
the agent had not yet disclosed her agency capacity.29
The seller in Artemis Seafood, Inc. v. Butcher's Choice, Inc.3° was also
able to satisfy the statute of frauds without having a signed writing where
the buyer accepted delivery of large quantities of frozen seafood which
were later invoiced to the buyer and for which the buyer failed to pay.
The court held that the seller met both the "merchant's exception" and
22. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(a) (Vernon 1994).
23. The exceptions include a confirming writing to which no objection is given, see
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(b) (Vernon 1994); specially manufactured goods,
§ 2.201(c)(1); admission in pleadings, testimony, or otherwise in court that a contract was
made, § 2.201(c)(2); and goods for which payment has been made or accepted or goods
which have been received or accepted, § 2.201(c)(3). Texas caselaw has added an addi-
tional exception to the statutory requirements if a party is equitably estopped from assert-
ing the statute of frauds as a defense. See, e.g., Brookside Farms v. Mama Rizzo's, Inc., 873
F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (stating that Texas recognizes promissory estoppel as
an exception to statute of frauds); "Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492
S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1972) (stating that promissory estoppel is available where party has
promised to put oral agreement in writing). The estoppel exception also appears as a statu-
tory provision in section 2A.201(d)(4), governing leases of personal property. See TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.201(d)(4) (Vernon 1994).
24. 994 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
25. See id. at 835.
26. See id. at 836.
27. 997 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1999, pet. denied).
28. See id. at 831.
29. See id.
30. 1999 WL 608853 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
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the part performance exception in the statute of frauds and allowed re-
covery for the invoiced amounts. 31
B. WARRANTIES
The overlap between the theories of negligence, strict liability, and
warranty under Texas law has been noted in several prior Survey arti-
cles. 32 The extent of this overlap is nicely illustrated by a decision reached
during this Survey period in Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez,33 where an
injured plaintiff alleged that a motor vehicle was not crashworthy because
of design defects in the roof structure and passenger restraint system. The
supreme court held that when a case is tried on theories of negligence,
strict liability, and breach of implied warranty, the trial court is not re-
quired to submit separate instructions on each theory when the issue to
be determined by the jury is identical. 34 In Rodriguez, the controlling
issues regarding the alleged design defects were identical and a single in-
struction on this issue was proper to avoid confusing the jury. The Court
noted that, to the extent some elements of a case may differ from one
theory to another, separate instructions may be required. For example,
causation on a breach of warranty theory requires a finding of proximate
cause but a strict liability theory requires only a finding of producing
cause. When such differences exist, separate instructions on those matters
is required. 35
Another area of overlapping claims concerns the relationship between
common law or Code warranties and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act (DTPA).36 Perhaps the most intriguing warranty case decided during
the Survey period was Arthur's Garage, Inc. v. Racal-Chubb Security Sys-
tems, Inc.,37 where a commercial customer (a lessee of business premises)
sued the fire and burglar alarm system installer for improper installation.
The system failed to detect a fire on the premises in a timely manner due
to improper wiring of smoke detectors, which were a part of the system.
The fire caused damages of some $58,000. Although suit was brought on
a variety of legal theories, the issues on appeal centered on the enforce-
ability of a limitation of liability clause, which limited damage recovery to
a maximum amount of $350 if the system failed to perform, and on an
indemnity clause, which protected the defendant from third-party
31. See id. at *2-3. The "merchant's exception" is applicable when a writing in confir-
mation of a contract is sent between merchants and no objection is made to its contents
within ten days after it is received. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(b) (Vernon
1994).
32. See, e.g., John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 51 SMU L. REV. 783, 787-91
(1998); John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 49 SMU L. REV. 775,781-85 (1996); John
Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 48 SMU L. REV. 973, 979-82 (1995).
33. 995 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1999).
34. See id. at 665.
35. See id. at 667-68.
36. The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act appears as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.43 -.63 (Vernon 1994).
37. 997 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
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claims.38 The court held that the limitation of liability clause was effec-
tive with respect to an express warranty claim asserted by the plaintiff
because the clause was part of the basis of the bargain between the par-
ties arising from the same contract that created the express warranty.39
The plaintiff also alleged, however, that the limitation of liability was in-
effective with regard to the common law implied warranty of good and
workmanlike performance in the repair or modification of existing tangi-
ble goods or property announced by the Texas Supreme Court in Melody
Home Manufacturing Co. v. Barnes.40 In Melody, the Supreme Court
also held that this implied warranty could not be waived or disclaimed.41
The court in Arthur's Garage was willing to recognize the existence of this
implied warranty in the abstract and its application to the repair and ser-
vicing of the alarm system. However, because the defendant had never
repaired, modified, or serviced the system, the court held that no implied
warranty had arisen.42 Since this warranty never came into existence, the
defendant could not be held liable for its breach. Applying the limitation
of liability clause to the implied warranty theory was, therefore, moot.
This did not end the case, however, because the plaintiff had also al-
leged misrepresentation and unconscionability claims under the DTPA
that were not dependent on the existence of a warranty whether express
or implied. As to these claims, the court held that the limitation of liabil-
ity clause was unenforceable because it attempted to waive rights created
by the DTPA in violation of the "no-waiver" provision contained in the
act itself.43 The plaintiff also contended that an indemnity clause con-
tained in the contract did not meet the fair notice requirements of con-
spicuousness and unambiguous terms. On this point, the court held that
the language of the indemnity clause was not ambiguous in its coverage
of any negligence, breach of warranty, or strict liability claims asserted by
third parties against the defendant, and that the clause was prominently
titled in capital letters and was conspicuous. 44 Under this clause, the de-
38. See id. at 808. The limitation of liability clause operated to cap damages for the
lessee's claim against the defendant. The indemnity clause operated to protect the defen-
dant from third party claims against the defendant because of the loss or destruction of any
property of such third parties located on the leased premises. In this case, the landlord, as
lessor of the premises, asserted a third-party claim and the defendant sought attorney's
fees from the lessee under the indemnity clause.
39. See id. at 812. On this point the court relied on the ruling announced in Southwest-
ern Bell Telephone Co. v. FDP Corp., 811 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1991). The court there held that
if a warranty can be disclaimed under the law creating it, a limitation of liability clause is
effective despite the "no-waiver" provision as it then appeared in the DTPA. See id. at
577. Although the "no-waiver" provision has since been modified to permit a waiver that
complies with specific statutory requirements, the reasoning in Southwestern Bell still
stands as to waivers that fail to comply with the DTPA. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
40. 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex. 1987).
41. See id. at 355.
42. See Arthur's Garage, 997 S.W.2d at 814.
43. See id. at 811. As to the "no-waiver" provision in the DTPA, see supra, note 40.
44. See Arthur's Garage, 997 S.W.2d at 815. The fair notice requirements are discussed
in more detail in the text at supra, note 3.
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fendant was entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred in defending a
claim asserted by the owner of the building who had leased the property
to the plaintiff.4
5
Negligence, breach of warranty, strict liability, and DTPA claims are
not the only instances where overlapping claims can go to a jury under a
broad form submission. This point is illustrated by Paul Mueller Co. v.
A Icon Laboratories, Inc.,46 where a buyer properly revoked acceptance of
stainless steel tanks because of rust and corrosion problems and sued for
both breach of contract and for breach of warranty. The seller argued that
the trial court erred because it did not submit damage issues separately
for the breach of contract and breach of warranty claims. The court of
appeals held that, because the incidental and consequential damages
flowing from the breach were the same regardless of the theory on which
such damages were based, a broad form submission was proper.47
C. GooDi FAITH PURCHASE
Several provisions in the Code deal with the problem of determining
rights between multiple parties who assert claims to the same property.48
One context in which a dispute may arise involves a transaction in which
innocent party A delivers property to B for a limited purpose but B, in
turn, sells the property to innocent party C. When A learns that C now
has (and intends to keep) the property and that it is useless to assert a
claim against B, the legal issue becomes one of allocating the loss be-
tween two innocent parties. Under Texas law, if the actions of B involve
criminal activity the question may arise in a property hearing held as part
of the criminal proceedings against B.49 In such hearings the property is
to be returned "to the person appearing by the proof to be the owner. 50
In a civil suit, the determination will probably be made under section
2.403 of the Code, which provides that a person with voidable title has
power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.51
Although the basis on which the property rights are to be determined is
not the same under these two statutes, the outcome may be identical as
shown by A. Benjamini, Inc. v. Dickson.5 2 In Benjamini, the owner of
two diamonds delivered them on consignment to Houston Gems & Ap-
praising for resale, but gave specific instructions that they were not to be
sold unless the owner approved the sale price. An employee stole the
45. See Arthur's Garage, 997 S.W.2d at 81.7.
46. 993 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet. h.).
47. See id. at 856-57.
48. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. COoE ANN. § 2.403 (Vernon 1994) (rights of good
faith purchaser or buyer in ordinary course of business as against owner); § 3.305 (rights of
holder in due course against prior parties); § 9.301 (rights of purchasers against un-
perfected security interests); § 9.312 (rights of secured creditors inter se).
49. Property hearings are conducted under TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 47.02
(Vernon 1979).
50. Id.
51. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CoDE ANN. § 2.403(a) (Vernon 1994).
52. 2 S.W.3d 611 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.).
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diamonds from the company safe and, together with an accomplice, sold
them to another jewelry company under a representation that the accom-
plice had inherited the diamonds and wanted to sell them. The jewelry
company bought the diamonds and later resold them to Benjamini. In a
property hearing conducted as part of the criminal proceeding against the
dishonest employee, the trial court determined that the original owner
appeared "by the proof" to have the right to the property. On appeal
Benjamini argued that it had a superior right as a good faith purchaser
under the terms of section 2.403. The court of appeals held that section
2.403 was not applicable to the case because it arose in the criminal pro-
ceedings and not in a civil suit between the original owner and the pur-
chaser.53 Even if the action were brought under the Code, however, the
court noted that the dishonest employee had not acquired the diamonds
"under a transaction of purchase" as required by section 2.403, but had
stolen the diamonds from the company safe. 54 Under these circum-
stances, even if section 2.403 had been applied, the result would be the
same.
55
Although not directly involving the issue of good faith purchase, the
decision in Wagal v. SI Diamond Technology, Inc.56 did concern the rela-
tive rights of competing claimants to goods. In this case, the buyer of
equipment sued the seller for conversion. The claim arose when the
seller refused to deliver the remaining equipment after the buyer de-
faulted in making the payments due under the contract. The seller resold
the equipment, applied the proceeds to the remaining balance due from
the buyer, and returned the surplus to the buyer. The court held that the
buyer had no right to recover in conversion because any title acquired by
the buyer under the contract of sale was subject to the seller's right to
reclaim goods still in its possession.57 The court noted that the right of
reclamation was a statutory right granted to unpaid sellers and could be
enforced by a seller in a manner similar to that of a secured party under
chapter 9.58
III. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, GUARANTIES, &
BANK TRANSACTIONS
A. TRANSFER OF INSTRUMENTS
Under the prior version of chapter 3 of the Code, as interpreted by the
Texas courts, an indorsement contained on an allonge was effective only
if there was inadequate space left to make the indorsement on the instru-
53. See id. at 613. A similar conclusion had been reached previously in Four B's Inc. v.
State, 902 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied). Four B's is discussed in John
Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 49 SMU L. REV. 775, 778 (1996).
54. See Benjamini, 2 S.W.3d at 613.
55. See id.
56. 998 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.)
57. See id. at 301. The court noted that, "It would be absurd to allow a seller to reclaim




ment itself.59 Under the revised chapter 3, an allonge may be used "even
though there is sufficient space on the instrument for an indorsement. ' '60
Although the Texas Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to con-
sider the revised chapter 3 as a guide interpretation of the prior law, 61 no
such willingness was exhibited by the court in Federal Financial Co. v.
Delgado,62 where the court held that an allonge could not be used for an
effective indorsement when the original note still had five inches of blank
space remaining on it.63 The purchaser of the note was, therefore, a mere
transferee instead of a holder.64 As such, the purchaser was subject to any
valid defenses of the makers. All of this was a tempest in a teapot, how-
ever, because the court further held that the makers failed to establish
their claimed defenses of laches and payment. 65
In Hudspeth v. Investor Collections Services Ltd. Partnership,66 how-
ever, the purchaser of a note did qualify as a holder in due course, albeit
under the federal holder in due course doctrine rather than under the
Code, even though the note was past due at the time of purchase.67 As a
holder in due course, the purchaser took the note free of the maker's
alleged personal defenses.68
Even the federal holder in due course doctrine is not always a safe
harbor against certain defenses. Thus, in Cadle Co. v. Henderson,69 the
purchaser of a note from the FDIC as receiver of a failed bank did not
protect the purchaser from a statute of limitations defense. The four-year
state limitations period had already run when the parties to the transfer
59. See Crossland Sav. Bank FSB v. Constant, 737 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1987, no writ). The use of an allonge (which means an additional page or pages
affixed to the original instrument to accommodate more indorsements) was authorized by
section 3.202(b) of the Code. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.202(B) (Vernon
1994). Chapter 3 of the Code was completely revised by the Act of May 28, 1995, 74th
Leg., R.S., ch. 921, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 4582 (codified as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 3.101 -.605 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 2000)). The new chapter 3 became effective
on January 1, 1996. See Act of May 28, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen.
Laws 4582, 4643.
60. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.204 cmt. 1 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
61. See, e.g., Southwestern Resolution Corp. v. Watson, 964 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1997)
(holding that relaxed requirements of revised chapter 3 applied to validate allonge at-
tached by staples instead of glue); Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d 793
(Tex. 1992) (holding that allowance of variable interest rates in revised UCC article 3 was
persuasive on issue of whether instrument met the "sum certain" requirement of then-
existing Code).
62. 1 S.W.3d 181 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet. h.).
63. See id. at 186.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. 985 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
67. As noted by the court, the federal holder in due course doctrine is a special rule
intended to protect federal agencies that insure depositary institutions and permits the
agencies and their assigns to assert holder in due course status to cut off defenses whether
or noi they satisfy the technical requirements of state law, principally the Code. See id. at
479-80.
68. Under both the federal holder in due course doctrine and under the Code, a
holder in due course takes an instrument free of personal defenses. See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 3.305(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
69. 982 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
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amended the assignment agreement under which the note was transferred
to permit the purchaser to use the six-year limitations period available to
the FDIC. The amendment was deemed necessary because the original
assignment provided that the transfer did not include "any rights, causes
of action or defenses peculiar to the [FDIC or Receiver] under any stat-
ute or rule of law."70
B. PAYMENT AS A DEFENSE
Both tender of payment and actual payment can operate to discharge a
party from further liability on an instrument.71 If the obligor alleges
tender of payment as a defense, he or she must prove that tender was
made to the holder of the instrument. Thus, in Coker v. Cramer Financial
Group, Inc. ,72 proof that the obligor tendered payment to a stranger who
was not acting as an agent of the owner or holder did not amount to proof
that tender of payment was made.73 The obligor, therefore, remained lia-
ble for the principal amount of the notes, plus interest at the highest law-
ful rate (18%), and attorney's fees incurred in the suit to collect the
notes.
74
In Southeast Investments, Inc. v. Clade,75 however, there was no dispute
that the obligor made actual payment of all installments due on a note;
the only question was whether any further amount was due under a pro-
vision in the note requiring additional payments for each year in which
the obligor's net profits exceeded one-hundred thousand dollars. Treating
interpretation of the note as a matter of law, the court held that the obli-
70. Id. at 544. In concluding that the amendment of the assignment after the state
limitations period had already expired came too late to permit the transferee to use the six-
year federal limitations period, the court noted, "This is an issue of first impression in
Texas. However, to accept Cadle's argument could result in the employment of unfair trial
tactics: assignees who failed to secure all the rights entitled to the FDIC in their original
agreements would essentially be given another bite at the apple, even after the time for
their first bite had expired. This is not what the record or the law permits." Id. at 548.
71. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.603 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
72. 992 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
73. See id. at 596.
74. See id. at 597. Southeast Investments, Inc. v. Claude also discusses the right of an
assignee to maintain an action for recovery on a lost instrument. See Southeast Invest-
ments, Inc. v. Clade, 1999 WL 476865 (N.D. Tex. 1999). The evidence showed that the note
in question was lost while in the FDIC's possession. The court held, however, that the
assignee stood in the shoes of the FDIC and had any enforcement rights held by the FDIC.
The plaintiff, therefore, satisfied the requirements of section 3.309 of the Code to enforce a
lost instrument, including an offer of indemnity if the note should later surface in the hands
of another holder. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.309 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
Whether an assignee has the right to recover on a note lost by a prior holder, but assigned
to the assignee, has yielded conflicting decisions under the revised UCC article 3. Compare
Dennis Joslin Co. v. Robinson Broad. Corp., 977 F. Supp. 491,494-95 (D.D.C. 1997) (hold-
ing assignee had no right to recover on note lost prior to assignment under revised UCC
§ 3-309) with Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Caddo Parish-Villas S., Ltd., 218 B.R. 851, 855 (N.D.
Tex. 1998) (holding assignee had right to recover on note lost prior to assignment where
assignment expressly included all rights of assignor, including right to enforce lost note).
See also John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 52 SMU L. REv. 813, 823 (1999) (dis-
cussing lost instruments).
75. 1999 WL 476865 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
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gor fully satisfied its obligations under the note and, in an unusual move,
the court itself moved for summary judgment on the issue of payment sua
sponte on behalf of the defendant obligor. The court directed the plaintiff
holder to respond to this motion.
C. GUARANTIES
In Taylor-Made Hose, Inc. v. Wilkerson,76 a creditor sought to impose
personal liability on the vice-president of a corporation who allegedly
guaranteed a debt incurred by the corporation. The credit application,
provided by the creditor, required only general information about the
corporation and did not require any personal information regarding the
vice-president who signed the application. At the bottom of the credit
application the form stated, "I personally agree to pay all invoices and
costs of collection ... on any amount remaining unpaid after 90 days."'77
The corporation subsequently filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and
the creditor sought recovery from the vice-president as guarantor. The
creditor argued that the agreement was a personal guaranty, that the vice-
president signed the credit application in her individual capacity as guar-
antor, and that the creditor would not have extended credit to the corpo-
ration without the vice-president's personal guaranty. The vice-president
argued that she did not sign in her individual capacity as a guarantor and
that this debt had been discharged in the corporation's bankruptcy.
On appeal, the court held that the credit application was ambiguous
and that no single provision in the agreement would be controlling; in-
stead, all provisions in the agreement would be considered in reference to
the instrument as a whole. 78 Applying this standard, the court noted that
the credit application was tailored for use by business entities and that
the application required no personal information regarding the person
who signed the application. The court pointed out that key words were
missing from the language of the agreement, words such as "guarantor"
and "individual capacity." The court reversed the summary judgment in
favor of the creditor and remanded the case for a factual determination
as to the intent of the parties.79
D. DELAYED RETURNS
OK, time for a test question.
76. 1999 WL 90021 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Feb. 24, 1999) (Opinion Not Yet Re-
leased for Publication). Although not yet released for publication, this case has already
been extensively cited for its discussion of the standard of review to be applied in no-
evidence motions for summary judgment, such as that made by the plaintiff creditor in this
case. See, e.g., Steinkamp v. Caremark, 3 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, pet. de-
nied), Ruiz v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 4 S.W.3d 838 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999,
no pet. h.); Marsaglia v. University of Texas, El Paso, 1999 WL 649241 (Tex. App.-El
Paso, Aug. 26, 1999, pet. denied).
77. 1999 WL 90021 at *1.




Suppose Payee receives a check from Drawer to pay a bill owed by
Drawer to Payee. Payee deposits the check in Payee's account at Deposi-
tary Bank and the check is ultimately presented through the Federal Re-
serve System to Payor Bank (whom you represent). Two banking days
later, Payor Bank returns the item to Depositary Bank marked "not suffi-
cient funds." Upon learning of the returned check, Payee takes immedi-
ate and successful steps to collect the amount of the check from Drawer.
Time passes.
Payee continues to do business with Drawer.
Drawer runs up another bill with Payee and is unable to pay. Payee
sues Payor Bank for failing to return the NSF check by its midnight
deadline.
Please choose the best answer from the selections given below. You
may assume that the UCC is the only applicable law and there is no fed-
eral regulation or clearinghouse rule that affects the case.
(A) Payor Bank is liable for the tort of having money.
(B) General equitable principles apply under UCC section 1.103 and
should relieve Payor Bank of liability for the return of the NSF
check after the midnight deadline.
(C) Payor Bank is accountable (i.e., strictly liable) under UCC section
4.302 for the amount of the NSF check that was returned after the
midnight deadline.
(D) Payor Bank is accountable (i.e., strictly liable) for the amount of
the NSF check but the Payee's recovery should be reduced be-
cause of the payment it received from Drawer earlier on the same
check.
According to the court in Channel Equipment Co. v. Community State
Bank,80 choice "D" is correct. The court rejected choice "B" on the
ground that use of general equitable principles to determine if a bank was
accountable for failing to return any particular check would "undermin[e]
the order and certainty that section 4.302 was designed to provide. 81
Choice "C" is almost correct because the court did uphold the strict ac-
countability rule of section 4.302, but not without qualification as to the
scope of the payor bank's liability.82 This leaves choices "A" and "D."
As stated by the court,
[T]he Bank is strictly accountable for the value of the checks. Equity
cannot modify that responsibility. Nonetheless, the Bank properly
raised equitable principles in determining the extent of that liability
.... [W]e believe the Bank conclusively established that further pay-
ments to Plaintiffs on the checks would violate equitable principles
of unjust enrichment and double recovery.8 3
80. 996 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet. h.).
81. Id. at 379.
82. See id. at 380.
83. Id. at 380-81. There were actually two checks and two payees involved in the case
but both checks were issued at the same time to pay the payees for the respective services
that each one had rendered to the drawers through the lease of construction equipment.
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Choice "A" was not before the court.
While it is clear that a bank customer has a responsibility under the
Code to notify his or her bank about forgeries on the customer's account,
determining whether the customer has met that responsibility in a partic-
ular factual setting is more difficult. In Hatcher Cleaning Co. v. Comerica
Bank-Texas,84 a bookkeeper had a rubber stamp of his employer's signa-
ture made surreptitiously. Over a two-year period, the bookkeeper used
this stamp to forge checks on his employer's bank accounts. When this
activity was discovered in July 1995, the employer sent a facsimile to the
bank on July 14th to "immediately ... place a blanket stop pay order on
the above-captioned payroll account .... -85 The bank complied and, dur-
ing the next several months, worked with the customer to provide copies
of checks and bank statements that had been paid from the account so
the customer could reconstruct records that had been destroyed by the
bookkeeper. The customer ultimately identified thirty-one unauthorized
checks for which demand letters were sent to the bank.
Under both the former and the revised section 4.406 of the Code, a
customer must "report" an unauthorized signature within one year after a
statement is made available to the customer.86 The issue before the court
had two parts: first, was the July 14th facsimile a sufficient "report" and,
second, did any of the subsequent communications with the bank, some
oral and some written, constitute reports? As to the first issue, the court,
noting a dearth of authority on the meaning of the term "report," held
that the facsimile communication on July 14th was not a sufficient "re-
port" to satisfy section 4.406 because it identified only the account num-
ber and did not identify specific items already paid that may have been
forged.87 As to the second issue, the court ruled that a report could be
either written or oral and that the employer's subsequent communica-
tions with the bank raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
these communications were sufficient "reports" under section 4.406.88
American Airlines Employees Federal Credit Union v. Martin89 also
concerned the interpretation and application of former section 4.406 but
This point had no bearing on the decision. This is an interesting and carefully reasoned
decision that collects a number of primary and secondary authorities on the scope of a
payor bank's liability for late return. It is worth keeping in mind in case the reader should
run into a late return problem.
84. 995 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet. h.).
85. Id. at 935.
86. Because the facts arose before January 1, 1996, the effective date of the revised
chapter 4, the court applied section 4.406(d). See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 4.406(d) (Vernon 1994). As revised, the relevant section now appears as TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(f) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
87. See Hatcher, 995 S.W.2d at 938.
88. See id. at 939. The court noted that it was construing the former version of TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(d) (Vernon 1994) and not the present version contained
in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(f) (Vernon Supp. 2000). See Hatcher, 995 S.W.2d
at 938-39. It does not appear, however, that the operative language in § 4.406 that was
considered by the court was changed by the revision in a way that would affect the court's
reasoning.
89. 991 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. granted).
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several additional issues were involved.90 In Martin, a customer's girl-
friend added herself as a joint owner of the customer's credit union ac-
count. Between June 12th and November 16th of 1995, she transferred
almost fifty thousand dollars from the customer's account to an account
she had at the same credit union. During this time period the credit union
mailed two quarterly statements showing the addition of the joint owner
on the account as well as showing ten of the fourteen transfers, but the
customer claimed he never saw the statements. Finally, on December 20,
1995, while making a deposit, the customer discovered the change in his
account balance, immediately told the credit union that the balance was
wrong, and later filed suit.
The credit union defended on three grounds. First, the customer failed
to report the unauthorized withdrawals within the sixty day time period
required by the deposit agreement. 91 Second, the customer failed to exer-
cise reasonable care and promptness in examining his statements to dis-
cover the unauthorized activity. Third, the customer failed to meet the
fourteen day time period stated in the former section 4.406 for unautho-
rized signatures or alterations by the same wrongdoer. 92
A critical factor in the case was that all of the account transfers had
been made by means of oral instructions from the customer's girlfriend
and documented by a "journal voucher" completed and initialed by an
employee of the credit union and never signed by the girlfriend herself.93
The only document she signed in connection with the entire matter was
the "Membership Account Change Card" used to add herself as a joint
owner of the customer's account.
As viewed by the court, much of the case hinged on the definition of
the terms "item" and "unauthorized signature." The court concluded that
neither the vouchers nor the account change card were "items" bearing
"unauthorized signatures" that triggered the customer's duty to report
within sixty days under the deposit agreement. 94 As to the customer's
claims for breach of contract and negligence on the part of the credit
union, the court addressed the question of whether the credit union had
90. As in Hatcher, although the court was construing the former version of § 4.406, it
does not seem that the language of the revision would affect the court's reasoning. The
reader should note that a petition has been granted in this case, and an opinion by the
Texas Supreme Court may provide significant guidance on the duties of a customer and a
bank under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
91. The deposit agreement specified that a customer was required to report unautho-
rized signatures or alterations on items within sixty days and that all objections were
"waived unless made in writing to us, and received on or before the sixtieth (60th) day
following the date the statement is mailed, subject to applicable law." Martin, 991 S.W.2d
at 892.
92. The time period in revised section 4.406(d)(2) is now thirty days. See TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 4.406(d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
93. Twelve of the fourteen transfers were done by telephone and for each of them a
teller generated and initialed a journal voucher. On the other two transfers, the customer's
girlfriend went to the credit union and orally instructed the teller to transfer funds, both of
which were also handled by means of journal vouchers. See Martin, 991 S.W.2d at 890-91.
94. See id. at 894-96.
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acted according to reasonable commercial standards when it failed (by its
own admission) to examine the signatures on the account change card.
Expert testimony on behalf of the credit union showed that "large na-
tional credit unions do not verify signatures at all when the ownership
status of an account is changed. '95 Expert testimony on standards in the
banking industry indicated that banks "verify signatures on account
change cards, and that experienced, trained personnel are used in signa-
ture verification. ' 96 The credit union used only untrained temporary
personnel.
The court upheld the trial court's determination that the credit union
was negligent in allowing the addition of a co-owner to the customer's
account.
97
IV. LETTERS OF CREDIT
A. RECENT CASES
In Vest v. Pilot Point National Bank,98 a road construction company
obtained an irrevocable standby letter of credit from a bank to assure
performance of a road building contract with Denton County. The letter
of credit required that if the construction company defaulted on the pro-
ject, a statement of the default was to be certified by the judge of Denton
County as a condition of the county making a draw under the credit. Af-
ter a default occurred, the acting county judge for Denton County, who
had been delegated by the elected county judge to preside over the
county commissioners court on a temporary basis, executed a statement
of default on official county commissioners court letterhead that identi-
fied the signer as the acting county Judge. The bank paid on the letter of
credit. The construction company sued the bank for wrongfully honoring
the letter of credit, contending that payment should have been made only
upon a statement of default signed by the elected county judge and not by
another person serving only temporarily as acting county judge.
The court ruled that determination of an inconsistency with the re-
quired documentation on a letter of credit must be made from the issuing
95. Id. at 899.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 899-900. Although it is difficult to predict exactly which issues may be
addressed by the Supreme Court if the grant of a petition in this case ultimately results in
an opinion, the issue of compliance with reasonable commercial standards that is now a
part of the statutory definition of ordinary care in the revised Code may play a part if the
Court regards this definition as declaratory of the prior Code. See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 3.103(a)(7), 4.104(c), 4.406(e) (Vernon 2000). As to the possibility that the
revised definition may be used, see McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit Union, 772 S.W.2d
183 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ), where, under the former chapters 3 and 4, the court
held that the failure of a credit union to examine signatures on items was not commercially
reasonable.
Another issue that may be addressed is the ability of a drawee to change the one-year
time period for barring customer claims for forgeries or alterations to a shorter time period
as the drawee attempted to do under the deposit agreement in Martin.
98. 996 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1999, pet. denied).
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bank's perspective. Because the bank could not be expected to be knowl-
edgeable about the county government or whether a statement of default
by an acting county judge instead of the elected county judge would be
significant to the company, the court ruled that the tendered document
reasonably complied with the terms of the credit. 99 The court added that,
had the company wanted to require the signature of a specific person as
an express condition, it could have done so, and the bank would then
have known precisely and unequivocally its duty under the letter of
credit.10 0
A fundamental premise underlying letter of credit law is that an issuer
must pay against documents when those documents comply with the
terms of the credit regardless of disputes that may exist between the par-
ties in regard to the transaction that gave rise to the letter of credit. 1° 1
This premise, commonly termed the "independence principle," is subject
to a small exception if the documents presented to the issuer are forged
or if there has been such fraud in the transaction that the issuer should be
enjoined from honoring the presentation made under the letter of
credit. 102
In SRS Products Co. v. LG Engineering Co., 0 3 the court addressed
both the independence principle and the scope of the fraud exception and
concluded that the narrow exception for fraud did not encompass a
breach of warranty claim asserted against a seller who refused to perform
warranty service on goods purchased by the buyer. In a clear opinion
reviewing both the independence principle and the fraud exception, the
court stated that,
A dispute over the existence or scope of warranty obligations does
not amount to fraud in the transaction, and therefore, does not pro-
vide grounds to enjoin payment of a letter of credit issued to secure
performance of those obligations .... [I]t would fly in the face of
Article Five to enjoin payment on the letter of credit based solely on
a dispute between the bank's customer and the beneficiary over un-
derlying contractual obligations.10 4
99. See id. at 11-14. In reaching this conclusion, the court discussed New Braunfels
National Bank v. Odiorne, 780 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied), where
the court distinguished between discrepancies relating to the issuer's business of banking
and discrepancies relating to the underlying transaction. Odiorne is cited with approval in
the revised TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.108 cmt. 1 (Vernon 2000).
100. See Vest, 996 S.W.2d at 16.
101. See, e.g., Philipp Bros., Inc. v. Oil Country Specialists, Ltd., 787 S.W.2d 38 (Tex.
1990) (finding no fraud in the transaction even though goods delivered were substantially
below quality called for by the underlying contract); GATX Leasing Corp. v. DBM Drill-
ing Corp., 657 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, n.w.h.) (holding that fraud must
be so egregious as to vitiate the transaction).
102. See Philipp Bros., 787 S.W.2d at 38.
103. 994 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.).
104. Id. at 385-86. See discussion "Fraud in the transaction" under revised section 5.109
infra note 140; see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.109 (Vernon 2000).
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B. LEGISLATIVE REVISION OF CHAPTER 5
The legislative revision of chapter 5 of the Code during the 1999 legis-
lative session was so extensive that the revised chapter substantially re-
places the original version.' 0 5 The revised chapter 5 became effective on
September 1, 1999.106 Because of space limitations, the following sum-
mary can list only some of the changes. A more detailed discussion of the
revision can be found in the sources listed in the accompanying
footnote. 107
1. Definitional Changes and Choice of Law
Two party letters of credit are now expressly allowed; thus, one branch
of a bank may issue a letter of credit for the benefit of another branch, or
a bank may issue a letter of credit to secure its own obligation. 10 8 "Issuer"
is defined to include nonbank issuers. 10 9 A new definition, the "nomi-
nated person," covers persons whom the issuer authorizes to pay, negoti-
ate, or give value for draws under a letter of credit with the expectation
or agreement of obtaining reimbursement from the issuer. 110 The term
"applicant" is now used instead of the term "customer."' I Chapter 5 ex-
pressly recognizes the right of the parties to incorporate and have a letter
of credit governed by the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documen-
tary Credits as promulgated by the International Chamber of
Commerce.112
Issuers, advisers and payors under a letter of credit have complete free-
dom to choose the governing law and forum for disputes even if the law
or forum chosen bears no relation to the transaction.' 13 Absent a choice
of law provision, the law of the place of the issuer, advisor, or nominated
person governs. 114
105. As revised, chapter 5 now appears as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.101 -.117(Vernon Supp. 2000).
106. Act of April 7, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 4, § 9 (Vernon) (to be codified as an
amendment to TEX. Bus. COM. CODE ANN. § 5).
107. See JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LE-1TERS OF CREDIT: COMMERCIAL AND
STANDBY CREDITS (3d ed. 1999); WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & FREDERICK H. MILLER, 66
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES: REVISED ARTICLE 5 LETVFERS OF CREDIT §§ 5-101
to 5-117 (1996); 3 JAMES WHITE & ROBERT SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
PRACrIIONER TREATISE SERIES H§ 26-1 to 26-16 (4th ed. 1995 & Supp. 1999); James G.
Barnes & James E. Byrne, Revision of UCC Article 5, 50 Bus. LAW. 1449 (1995).
108. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.102(a)(10) (Vernon 2000).
109. See § 5.102(a)(9).
110. See § 5.102(a)(11).
111. See § 5.102(a)(2).
112. See §§ 5.103(c), 5.116(c). The current version of the Uniform Customs and Prac-
tices for Documentary Credits is designated as I.C.C. Pub. No. 500 (1.993) (hereinafter
UCP).
113. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.116(a) (Vernon 2000).
114. See § 5.116(b).
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2. Rules on Nondocumentary Conditions Clarified and Non-Waivable
Conditions Expressly Stated
Nondocumentary conditions, unless they are so fundamental that they
cause the document not to be a letter of credit, are to be ignored by the
issuer. 115 The provisions of chapter 5 that cannot be varied by agreement
are now explicitly stated.1 16
3. Rights of Beneficiaries Accorded to Successors
Successors to the beneficiary by operation of law, such as bankruptcy
trustees, receivers, executors, and successors by merger are accorded the
rights of the beneficiary under the letter of credit, a result that was
reached with some uncertainty under the prior chapter 5.117 Successors to
beneficiaries by operation of law and beneficiaries that change a corpo-
rate name when merging with another entity may consent to amend-
ments, sign and present documents, and receive payment either in the
name of the beneficiary or in its own name as successor, provided the
successor beneficiary follows the requirements of the issuer for recogni-
tion of a successor that are standard practice for issuers or that are other-
wise reasonable.11 8 An issuer is protected if the purported successor's
proof of successorship is facially sufficient. 119
4. Independence and Strict Compliance Principles Expressly Stated
Although not a change from existing Texas case law interpreting the
prior chapter 5, the revised chapter 5 now expressly recognizes the inde-
pendence principle that the obligation of the issuer is independent of any
performance or breach of the underlying contract.' 20 The strict compli-
ance standard previously applied by Texas cases has also been statutorily
adopted. 121 Although documents presented for honor must strictly com-
ply with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit, the Official Com-
ment to section 5.108 notes that "strict compliance" does not mean
115. See § 5.108(g).
116. The non-waivable conditions include the following: TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 5.102(a)(9), (10) (Vernon 2000) (what constitutes a letter of credit and who may issue
one); § 5.103(a) (applicability of chapter 5 to letters of credit); § 5.103(c) (provisions of
article 5 that cannot be varied by agreement); § 5.106(d) (five-year expiration date for
perpetual letter of credits); § 5.114(d) (issuer's right to withhold consent to assignment of
proceeds); § 5.117(d) (no subrogation rights until honor).
117. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.102(a)(15), .113 (Vernon 2000); FDIC v.
Bank of Boulder, 911 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1990).
118. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.102(a)(15), 5.113(b) (Vernon 2000).
119. See § 5.113(c), (d).
120. See §§ 5.103(d), 5.108(f); cf Philipp Bros., Inc. v. Oil Country Specialists, Ltd., 787
S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1990) (finding that issuer's obligation is independent of the underlying
transaction); see also, SRS Products Co., Inc. v. LG Engineering Co., Ltd., 994 S.W.2d 380
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (discussed supra, note 100).
121. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.108(f) (Vernon 2000); see also Westwind
Exploration, Inc. v. Homestate Sav. Ass'n, 696 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1985) (finding that pre-
sentment of demand for payment must strictly comply with terms of letter of credit); Tem-
ple-Eastex, Inc. v. Addison Bank, 672 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1984) (finding the same).
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"slavish compliance" and it indorses the approach taken in New Braun-
fels National Bank v. Odiorne.122 In determining whether documents
strictly comply with the terms of the credit, the issuer must observe the
standard practice of financial institutions that regularly issue letters of
credit. 123 Determination of compliance with that standard is a matter for
the court and not for the jury. 124
5. Electronic Letters of Credit Allowed
In recognition of the growing use of electronic technology, letters of
credit may now be issued in electronic form.' 25 The terms "document"
and "record" are defined to include documents or records presented or
kept in a tangible medium or in electronic form if authorized by the letter
of credit. 126 The methods by which a record may be authenticated are
described in the Official Comment to section 5.104.127
6. Enforceability, Irrevocability, Amendment, and Expiration
Consistent with UCP 500, a letter of credit is now irrevocable unless by
its terms it is stated to be revocable.' 28 A letter of credit is issued and
becomes enforceable when it is sent or transmitted, not when it is re-
ceived.' 29 After a letter of credit has been issued, the rights of the issuer,
beneficiary, applicant, or confirmer are not affected by an amendment to
it without their consent unless the letter of credit it revocable.' 30 A letter
of credit without an expiration date expires one year from date of issu-
ance and a "perpetual" letter of credit expires five years from date of
issuance. 131
7. Issuer's Duties Clarified
An issuer has a reasonable time, but not beyond seven business days
after receipt, to determine if a presentment is conforming and, if so, to
give notice of discrepancies. 132 Deferred payment letters of credit are
122. See 780 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied); TEX. Bus. & CoM.
CODE ANN. § 5.108(a), 5.108 cmt. 1 (Vernon 2000) stating, "[T]his article indorses the con-
clusion of the court in New Braunfels Nat. Bank ... (beneficiary could collect when draft
requested payment on 'Letter of Credit No. 86-122-5' and letter of credit specified 'Letter
of Credit No. 86-122-S' holding strict compliance does not demand oppressive perfection-
ism)." TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 5.108(a), 5108 cmt. 1 (Vernon 2000).
123. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 5.108(a), (e) (Vernon 2000).
124. See id.
125. See §§ 5.102(a)(14), 5.104.
126. See §§ 5.102(a)(6), (a)(14).
127. See § 5.104 cmts. 2, 3 (Vernon 2000), providing, inter alia, that, "An authentication
agreement may be by system rule, by standard practice, or by direct agreement between
the parties." Id.
128. Compare UCP 500, art. 6(c) with TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.106(a)
(Vernon 2000).
129. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.106(a) (Vernon 2000).
130. See § 5.106(b).
131. See § 5.106(c), (d).
132. See § 5.108(b).
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now expressly authorized. 133 "Honor" is defined to include actual pay-
ment on a deferred obligation or acceptance. 134 Except for fraud or for-
gery, an issuer cannot defend dishonor of a presentment based on a
discrepancy for which notice was either not given or not timely given.135
An issuer that honors a presentment is precluded from recourse against
the beneficiary as the drawer or indorser of a draft under sections 3.414
and 3.415 or for discrepancies in the document or presentment that are
apparent.136 Issuers may state requirements for transfer of the right to
draw or to demand performance in the letter of credit or, even if no par-
ticular procedures for transfer are stated, may impose requirements that
are standard practice for issuers of letters of credit or that are otherwise
reasonable in the circumstances.137 An issuer need not recognize an as-
signment of proceeds of a letter of credit unless the assignee possesses
and exhibits the letter of credit and its presentation is a condition to
honor.' 38 After payment or honor, the issuer or other payor and any ap-
plicant that reimburses an issuer are accorded broad subrogation rights
against other parties if subrogation is otherwise appropriate under other
law.139 Remedies for wrongful dishonor now include the amount wrong-
fully dishonored, incidental but not consequential damages, interest, at-
torneys' fees, and specific performance.' 40 A beneficiary need not
mitigate damages. 14' Claims for breach of a right or obligation under
chapter 5 must be brought within the later of one year after expiration of
the letter of credit or after the cause of action accrues. 142
8. Rules on Forgery and Fraud Restated
Although dishonor of, or an injunction against, a forged document or
fraudulent presentment is still permitted, the exceptions and substantive
and procedural conditions to such a dishonor or injunction are elabo-
rated. These include observing the rights of innocent parties who give
value, requirements for posting security, and requirements for meeting
established preconditions for granting injunctive relief.' 43
9. New Warranties by Beneficiaries
A beneficiary that obtains payment now warrants to the issuer and to
the applicant that there is no fraud or forgery involved and that the draw-
ing does not violate any agreement to which the letter of credit
133. See § 5.108(b)(2).
134. See § 5.102(a)(8).
135. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.108(c), (d) (Vernon 2000).
136. See §§ 5.108(i)(3), (4). The obligations of drawers and indorsers appear in TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.414, 3.415 (Vernon 2000), respectively.
137. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.112(b)(2) (Vernon 2000).
138. See § 5.114(d).
139. See § 5.117.
140. See § 5.111.
141. See id.
142. See § 5.115.




10. Rules Stated for Security Interests in Proceeds
A procedure under chapter 9 has been added for granting a security
interest in the proceeds of a letter of credit.145 The rights of a transferee




The last Survey discussed the decision In re Rees,'1 47 in which a bank-
ruptcy court decided that Department of Agriculture regulations under
the Federal Crop Insurance Act, requiring assignment of the right to re-
ceive payment under a crop insurance policy, did not prevent attachment
and perfection of a security interest to the proceeds of a crop insurance
policy, but only prevented attachment to an insured's right to receive the
proceeds before they were actually paid.148 During this Survey period the
Fifth Circuit held that, "The bankruptcy's court's reasoning in Rees is
sound; its conclusion correct."' 149 On this basis, the court held that a se-
curity interest attached to, and was perfected in, the proceeds of a crop
insurance policy purchased by the debtors under the Federal Crop Insur-
ance Act.'50
Priority conflicts between secured parties are generally governed by
Code sections 9.301 through 9.319.151 As with other claims, however, an
assertion that a security interest has priority must be made within the
relevant limitations period. In some contexts, this may be in the form of
an action for conversion of collateral from the secured party who asserts
priority. Such claims must be brought within two years from the time the
conversion occurs unless, for some reason, the limitations period is
tolled.' 52 One reason for tolling the limitations period is the "discovery
rule," which provides that accrual of a cause of action is deferred until the
claimant knew, or by exercising reasonable diligence should have known,
144. See § 5.110.
145. To establish this procedure, the revision of chapter 5 includes provisions in chapter
5 and conforming amendments in the current chapter 9. See §§ 5.102(a)(10), 5.114(f),
9.103(a), 9.104(13), 9.106, 9.304(a), 9.305. The revision of chapter 9 (effective on July 1,
2001) carries forward the provisions dealing with security interests in the proceeds of a
letter of credit.
146. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 5.114(f) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
147. 216 B.R. 551 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998). Rees is discussed in John Krahmer, Com-
mercial Transactions, 52 SMU L. REV. 813, 828-29 (1999).
148. See Rees, 216 B.R. at 554. The regulations in question appeared in 7 C.F.R. § 457.8
(1995).
149. In re Cook, 169 F.3d 271, 277 (5th Cir. 1999).
150. See id.
151. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.301 -.319 (Vernon 1997).
152. The two-year limitations period for conversion actions is stated in TEX. CIv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 16.003(a).
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of the facts giving rise to the cause of action. In Conoco, Inc. v. Amarillo
National Bank,153 the court remanded a conversion action to the court of
appeals for reconsideration of the discovery rule in light of the decision
by the Supreme Court in HECI Exploration Company v. Neel.154 The
court of appeals held that the discovery rule tolled the limitations period
in an action by a secured party claiming priority in accounts receivable.
155
Without ruling on the merits, the Supreme Court remanded the case to
the court of appeals to determine whether the discovery rule was even
applicable under the HECI principles that the discovery rule should be
applied only when (1) the nature of the injury is inherently undiscover-
able, and (2) the injury itself is objectively verifiable. 156
Foreclosure of a security interest is always fraught with danger under
existing Texas law. Failure of a secured party to give proper notice of
disposition or to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable man-
ner will prevent the secured party from recovering a deficiency. 157 The
burden of proving that proper notice and disposition took place is on the
secured party.158 In SMS Financial, L.L.C. v. ABCO Homes, Inc.,159 sum-
mary judgment in favor of the secured party was reversed because there
was a genuine issue of material fact on whether bowling alley equipment
used as collateral for a loan was disposed of in a commercially reasonable
manner.
160
One of the continuing problems associated with UCC financing state-
ment filings is the possibility of a mistake in the debtor's name. But the
Code provides for some margin of error if the financing statement is not
seriously misleading. In ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Bank of the
West,16 1 the court considered whether a financing statement that listed
the name of the debtor as "Compucentro, USA, Inc." instead of
"Compu-Centro, USA, Inc." was within the allowed margin of error. The
court first held that a non-uniform amendment to the Texas version of the
Code did not apply to the case of a misspelling of a corporate name.'
62
The court then considered whether the omission of the hyphen in the
corporate name made the filing seriously misleading. On this issue, the
court discussed the computerized search system used in the office of the
Texas Secretary of State and its treatment of hyphenated words. Because
the filing omitted the hyphen in the name "Compu-Centro," the search
153. 996 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1999).
154. 982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998).
155. See Conoco, Inc. v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 950 S.W.2d 790, 798 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1997, writ granted).
156. See Conoco, 996 S.W.2d at 854. The principles governing the discovery rule are
stated in HECI, 982 S.W.2d at 886.
157. See Tanenbaum v. Economics Lab., Inc., 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982).
158. See Greathouse v. Charter Nat'l Bank-Southwest, 851 S.W.2d 173, 176-77 (Tex.
1992).
159. 166 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1999).
160. See id. at 244.
161. 166 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1999).
162. See id. at 300 (citing Jerald M. Pomerantz, Trade Name Filings Under UCC Article
9: Anatomy of a Nonuniform Amendment, 47 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 34, 36 (1993)).
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system would not locate a filing under the name "Compucentro." Rea-
soning that the policy of the Code was to place the burden of accurate
filing on the filing creditor, the court held that the financing statement
was seriously misleading because a subsequent search based on the
debtor's legal name would not (indeed, did not) reveal the misspelled
name.
163
B. LEGISLATIVE REVISION OF CHAPTER 9
The revision of chapter 9 approved during the 1999 legislative session
completely replaces the existing chapter 9. As noted earlier in this Arti-
cle, the effective date of the revision is July 1, 1999, which provides some
"lead time" for attorneys and financial institutions to become familiar
with the new rules governing secured transactions. 164 The following sum-
mary briefly describes several important subjects covered by the revised
chapter 9.
1. New Types of Collateral Allowed
Revised chapter 9 permits the use of several new types of collateral. An
expanded definition of "account" now includes health care insurance re-
ceivables and certain insurance payments, the service of providing ener-
gy (gas, electricity, etc.), credit or charge cards and information con-
tained on or for use with the card (e.g., information contained in
a magnetic stripe or an embedded chip), and lottery or gambling win-
nings. 165 New types of collateral that are separately defined include:
commercial tort claims,166 deposit accounts, 167 electronic chattel pa-
163. See ITT Commercial Finance, 166 F.3d at 304-05. The court noted, but did not
discuss, the recent revision of chapter 9, which provides, inter alia, that, "If a search of the
records of the filing office under the debtor's correct name, utilizing the filing office's stan-
dard search logic, if any, would disclose a financing statement that fails sufficiently to pro-
vide the name of the debtor in accordance with Section 9-503(a), the name provided does
not make the financing statement seriously misleading." U.C.C. § 9-506(c).
Although not discussed by the court, the test provided by the revision would seem to
lead to the same result as that reached by the court since a search made under the debtor's
correct name did not reveal the filing made in the incorrect name that omitted a critical
hyphen. Further discussion of financing statement filings under the revised chapter 9 ap-
pears in the text, infra, at note 189.
164. Because the changes made by the revision are both extensive and complex, The
Texas Bank Lawyer and the Texas Tech Law School Foundation have prepared a resource
disk on CD-ROM in hypertext format. It contains the full text of the revision as adopted
in Texas, plus disposition tables, collateral tables, search software, and text discussions of
changes made by the revision. The resource disk will be updated with additional material
from time to time. For information about this CD-ROM contact John Krahmer, Texas Tech
University School of Law, Lubbock, Texas 79409-0004. Telephone inquiries may be di-
rected to (806) 742-3920 (Voice) or (806) 742-1629 (FAX). Professor Krahmer may also be
contacted by email sent to: jkrahmer@krahmer.net.
165. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.102(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2000). Note
that this Supplement contains the text of both the current chapter 9 that will be effective
until July 1, 2001 and the revised chapter 9 that will become effective on that date. To
distinguish between these two versions of chapter 9, references to the revised chapter 9
insert the designation "Rev." before the section number in the citations that follow.
166. See Rev. § 9.102(a)(13).
167. See Rev. § 9.102(a)(29).
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per,168 letter of credit rights,169 payment intangibles as a form of general
intangible,170 software of two types, that embedded in goods, such as a
chip contained in a hand-held calculator, 171 and "stand alone"
software, 172 and supporting obligations such as guaranties or other secon-
dary obligations that support the payment or performance of accounts,
chattel paper or the like. 173
2. Sales of Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment Intangibles, and
Promissory Notes
Revised chapter 9 applies to the sale of accounts, chattel paper, pay-
ment intangibles, and promissory notes, as well as to security interests in
these types of collateral. 174 Clauses waiving defenses by account debtors
and preventing affirmative recovery against assignees are clarified by the
revision.' 75
3. Definition of "Secured Party" Expanded
The definition of "secured party" has been expanded to include a vari-
ety of persons with interests in certain property to better correlate the
interests of such persons with those traditionally associated with security
interests. The term now includes consignors, persons holding an agricul-
tural lien (e.g., cropshare leases), persons who have purchased accounts,
chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, and persons who
hold security interests arising from other provisions of the Code. 176
4. Simplified Collateral Descriptions Allowed in Security Agreements
and Financing Statements
The manner in which collateral is described in a security agreement has
been broadened, including a "safe harbor" for description by "a type of
collateral" defined in chapter 9 (e.g., accounts, inventory, etc.). 177
Description by "type" is not sufficient, however, for commercial tort
claims, consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities account, or a
commodity account. 178 Descriptions such as "all of the debtor's assets"
or "all of the debtor's personal property" are not sufficient descriptions in
a security agreement, but they are sufficient descriptions for purposes of
a financing statement. 179
168. See Rev. § 9.102(a)(31).
169. See Rev. § 9.102(a)(51).
170. See Rev. § 9.102(a)(42), (a)(62).
171. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.102(a)(44) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
172. See Rev. § 9.102(a)(76).
173. See Rev. § 9.102(a)(78).
174. See Rev. § 9.109(a)(3).
175. See Rev. §§ 9.403, 9.406.
176. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.102(a)(73) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
177. See Rev. § 9.108(b).
178. See Rev. § 9.108(d), (e).
179. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE. ANN. Rev. § 9.108(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000)
with § 9.504(2). The description of collateral in a financing statement can be extremely
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5. Methods for Creating and Perfecting Security Agreements Expanded
and Standardized
While a security agreement under revised chapter 9 can still take the
form of a written document signed by the debtor, the revision also con-
templates the use of security agreements that take the form of "records"
stored in an electronic or other medium that are retrievable in a perceiv-
able form, for example, printed copy generated from a computer disk.180
To be an effective security agreement, such a record must be "authenti-
cated," and this can be done by such means as an encryption that identi-
fies the authenticating party. 181 Under the revised chapter 9, there is no
longer any requirement that the debtor sign a financing statement if the
debtor has signed a security agreement or authenticated a record creating
a security interest; the secured party is, instead, authorized to file a fi-
nancing statement that conforms to the terms of the security agree-
ment. 182  Uniform forms for financing statements, continuation
statements, termination statements, and the like, are now contained in
chapter 9 itself.' 83 Filings can be made electronically or in paper form.' 84
In the 1999 legislative session, the Texas Legislature also adopted provi-
sions regarding electronic filing to make it clear that such filings are pres-
ently available under the existing version of chapter 9.185 The revised
chapter 9 will, therefore, not change existing Texas law in this regard.
6. Definition of Proceeds Expanded and Tracing Approved
The definition of proceeds has been expanded under the revised chap-
ter 9 to make it clear that the term includes whatever the debtor receives
upon sale, lease, license, exchange, collection, distribution, loss or other
disposition of collateral. 86 Tracing is specifically approved as a means of
identifying proceeds. 18 7
7. Definition of Purchase Money Security Interest Expanded and
Clarified; Dual-Status Rule Adopted
The definition of "purchase money security interest" has been ex-
panded and clarified by the revised chapter 9 and, in addition, the revi-
broad. For example, a description of "all assets" or "all personal property" is acceptable.
See Rev. § 9.504(2). Note, however, that this allowance of super-generic descriptions does
not extend to descriptions contained in the security agreement. See Rev. § 9.108(c). Fix-
ture filings and timber or mineral filings continue to require real estate descriptions. See
Rev. § 9.502(b).
180. See Rev. § 9.102(a)(70).
181. See Rev. §§ 9.102(a)(7), (a)(70), 9.203.
182. See Rev. §§ 9.502, 9.509.
183. See Rev. § 9.521.
184. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.516 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
185. See Act of March 11, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 149, §§ 1, 2, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws
494, (effective May 21, 1999); Act of May 19, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 569, § 1, 1999 Tex.
Gen. Laws 707, (effective June 18, 1999).
186. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. §§ 9.102(a)(65), 9.203(e)(1) (Vernon
Supp. 2000).
187. See Rev. § 9.315(b)(2).
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sion statutorily adopts the "dual-status" rule in non-consumer
transactions to protect renewal or refinancing of purchase money transac-
tions. 188 This should avoid the "transformation rule" that has been a
problem in the refinancing of purchase money interests under the present
chapter 9.189
8. Rules for Determining Jurisdiction for Filing Substantially Changed;
Other Methods of Perfection Permitted
The rules for determining the jurisdiction where a financing statement
must be filed to perfect a security interest have been substantially
changed. Perhaps the most important change is a requirement that fi-
nancing statements be filed in the state where the debtor is located in-
stead of in the state where the collateral is located. 190 For purposes of
this rule, the location of a corporate or other "entity" debtor is in the
state of incorporation.' 9 Despite this change in determining where a fi-
nancing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest, however,
the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located will continue to
govern issues concerning the effect of perfection, for example, in disputes
concerning priorities. 92 Security interests in certain collateral can be per-
fected only by taking "control" of the collateral, a concept that was intro-
duced in the revised chapter 8,193 and that has been extended in the
revised chapter 9 to include, in addition to investment property, security
interests in deposit accounts,194 electronic chattel paper,1 95 and letter of
credit rights. 196 As a general proposition, "control" requires the assent of
the person who maintains the records showing ownership of the property
to be "controlled." For example, the bank where the debtor has a deposit
account must assent to the secured party having control of the account.
Perfection can be automatic if the secured party is the same person as the
person that maintains the records, for example, if the secured party is also
the bank where the deposit account is maintained.
Under revised chapter 9, possession remains as a proper method of
perfection and, in some instances, is the best method of perfection. For
example, possession of instruments is safer than filing because it prevents
transfer of an instrument to a holder in due course. Perfection by posses-
sion can be used whenever the collateral is in a form that is capable of
188. See Rev. § 9.103.
189. See Rev. § 9.103(e). See also John Krahmer, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Com-
mercial Transactions, 51 SMU L. REV. 783, 799-800 (1998) (for a discussion of the "dual-
status" rule and the "transformation" rule).
190. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000) with Rev.
§§ 9.301, 9.307.
191. See Rev. § 9.307(e).
192. See Rev. § 9.301(3).
193. See § 8.106.
194. See Rev. §§ 9.102(a)(29), 9.104, 9.312(b) & 9.314. Cf. § 9.304(a) (the present non-
uniform Texas amendment) covering "book-entry" certificates of deposit.
195. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. §§ 9.102(a)(31), 9.105, 9.312(a), 9.314(a)
(Vernon Supp. 2000).
196. See Rev. §§ 9.102(a)(51), 9.107, 9.308(d), 9.312(b)(2), 9.314(c), 9.409.
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being possessed, that is, when the property has a tangible form. For ex-
ample, possession can be used to perfect a security interest in negotiable
documents, goods, instruments, money, certificated securities, or tangible
chattel paper.197 Security interests in intangible collateral, such as elec-
tronic chattel paper, must be perfected by filing or control.t 98 If the col-
lateral is in the possession of a third party, such as a bailee who has not
issued a document of title covering the goods, the secured party has pos-
session from the time the third party acknowledges that it holds posses-
sion for the benefit of the secured party.' 99
Except for fixture filings and filings covering timber or minerals (which
are termed "as-extracted collateral"), 2°° financing statement filings are
centralized in the Office of the Secretary of State by the revised chapter
9.201 This represents only a modest change from the non-uniform version
of section 9.401 that is presently in effect in Texas.202 The non-uniform
Texas amendment dealing with the rights of persons as interest owners in
oil and gas production that currently appears in section 9.318 of the Code
has been retained as section 9.343 in the revision.203
9. Rules for Identifying the Debtor Clarified and Test of Identification
Standardized
The standards for specifying the name of the debtor used in a financing
statement are clarified and a statutory test based on the search logic used
by the filing office is stated for judging if the name is seriously
misleading. 204
10. Concept of Perfection by Control Extended to Several Forms of
Collateral; Setoff Rights Given Super-Priority
Security interests in deposit accounts, promissory notes, letter of credit
rights, and investment property perfected by possession or control take
priority over security interests perfected by filing.20 5 The "super-priority"
of purchase money interests is continued and, in some instances, ex-
197. See Rev. § 9.313.
198. See Rev. § 9.314.
199. See Rev. § 9.313(e). If a negotiable document of title covers the goods, possession
of the document of title itself is required to perfect a security interest in the goods. See
Rev. § 9.313(a). If a non-negotiable document covers the goods, the bailee's receipt of
notification of the secured party's interest is sufficient. See Rev. § 9.312(d).
200. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.102(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
201. See Rev. § 9.501 (a).
202. See § 9.401 (a).
203. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.318 (Vernon 1991); TEX. Bus. & CoM.
CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.343 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
204. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. §§ 9.502(a)(1), 9.503, 9.506(b) (Vernon
Supp. 2000); see also ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Bank of the West, 166 F.3d 295 (5th
Cir. 1999) (where the court used this test as part of the basis for its decision under the
existing chapter 9).
205. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. §§ 9.107, 9.325, 9.328(l), 9.329, 9.330(d),
9.331(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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tended.20 6 Rights of setoff or recoupment by a depositary institution have
priority over a perfected security interest in a deposit account held by a
third party secured creditor unless the creditor has put the account in its
own name.
207
11. Rules on Transferees of Collateral Generally Unchanged
As against transferees of collateral, revised chapter 9 continues most of
the current rules. A buyer in the ordinary course of business, however,
will not take free of a security interest perfected by a secured party in
possession of the purchased goods.208 Transferees of money or of funds
from a deposit account take free of a security interest unless they act in
collusion with the debtor.20 9
12. Default Rules Made Applicable to Guarantors
Rules governing default are explicitly made applicable to secondary
obligors such as guarantors.210 This is consistent with the result reached in
Texas case law for some aspects of default under the old version of chap-
ter 9, but it may also extend this principle to some degree as regards pre-
default waivers. 211 The prohibition against pre-default waivers is ex-
panded to cover more subjects than are covered in the existing chapter
9.212 Except for letters of credit, a secured party has the explicit right to
enforce claims against secondary parties or account debtors who are obli-
gated on collateral. 213 A separate rule concerning enforcement of security
interests in rights under a letter of credit is stated in section 5.114 as re-
vised in 1999.214
206. See Rev. §§ 9.103(b)(2), 9.324.
207. See Rev. § 9.340. This will reverse the equitable setoff rule adopted in National
Indemnity Co. v. Spring Branch State Bank, 348 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. 1961).
208. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.320(e) (Vernon Supp. 2000); see also
Rev. § 1.201(9). This is intended to reverse the result reached in Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 350 N.E. 2d 590 (N.Y. 1976). See C. COOPER, THE NEW ARTICLE 9
35-36 (1999).
209. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.332 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
210. See Rev. §§ 9.102(a)(60), 9.102(a)(72), 9.602.
211. As to post-default notice, see, e.g., MBank Dallas v. Sunbelt Manuf., Inc., 710
S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that guarantor entitled to
notice before sale of collateral). As to pre-default waivers, see Rabinowitz v. Cadle Co. II,
Inc., 993 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet. h.), where the court found there
were no Texas state court cases addressing the precise issue, but holding that a guarantor,
before default, could not waive the right to have collateral sold in a commercially reasona-
ble manner. The court noted that the federal court reached a different result in Steinberg
v. Cinema N' Drafthouse Sys., Inc., 28 F.3d 23 (5th Cir. 1994), but rejected the reasoning of
the federal court as "wholly unpersuasive." See Rabinowitz, 993 S.W.2d at 799 n.1.
212. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.501(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000) with Rev.
§ 9.602.
213. See Rev. § 9.607.
214. See § 5.114. The revision of § 5.114 became effective on September 1, 1999 as part
of the revision of chapter 5 of the Code discussed, supra, note 144. Application of this rule
to security interests in letter of credit rights does not await the effective date of July 1, 2001
for the chapter 9 revision.
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13. Notice Rules on Disposition of Collateral Parallel Prior Texas Non-
Uniform Amendments
The revised chapter 9 adopts the non-uniform Texas amendment in the
current section 9.504 requiring that notice of sale be given to other se-
cured parties who have filed financing statements on the same collat-
eral.2 1 5 The revised chapter 9 also provides a "safe harbor" form for
giving notice of public sale to the debtor, to obligors, and to other secured
parties.21 6
14. Rebuttable Presumption Rule Adopted in Non-Consumer Cases;
Revision Takes No Position on Consumer Cases
Revised chapter 9 adopts the "rebuttable presumption rule" instead of
the "absolute bar rule" for non-consumer transactions. 217 This changes
the absolute bar rule adopted in Tanenbaum v. Economic Laborato-
ries,218 and subsequently applied in several Texas cases. 21 9 The revision
takes no position on the rule that should be applied in consumer transac-
tions, thus leaving open the possibility that the absolute bar rule will con-
tinue to apply in those cases.
15. Rules for Accepting Return and Retention of Collateral Liberalized
With Exception of Consumer Cases
Except in consumer transactions, a secured party may accept the return
of collateral in either full or partial satisfaction of a secured claim.220 A
secured party will not be deemed to have impliedly accepted collateral in
satisfaction of the debt; there must be an affirmative act of acceptance
before the secured party will be treated as having accepted the collateral
in satisfaction.22 1 Applied to the facts of Tanenbaum v. Economic Labo-
ratories,222 this rule would prevent treating the creditor as having ac-
cepted the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt; revised chapter 9
215. Compare § 9.504(c) (Vernon 1991) with Rev. § 9.611(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
216. See Rev. § 9.613.
217. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.626(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2000). Under
the absolute bar rule, if a creditor fails to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable
manner, the creditor is barred from recovering a deficiency. See, e.g., Milliorn v. Finance
Plus, Inc., 973 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1998, no pet.) (holding that failure to give
notice of public sale of collateral note barred recovery of deficiency but creditor entitled to
recover on a separate note not involved in commercially unreasonable foreclosure sale);
Havins v. First Nat'l Bank, 919 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ) (holding
that sale of collateral in a recognized market does not require prior notice but record did
not show that livestock auction was a recognized market; absent proof of notice and com-
mercially reasonable disposition or that sale was in a recognized market, creditor not enti-
tled to recover deficiency); ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Riehn, 796 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (holding that creditor who elects to sell collateral must both
give notice and sell in commercially reasonable manner to recover deficiency; failure to
meet either requirement makes sale an act of conversion).
218. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982).
219. See cases cited supra note 216.
220. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.618 & 9.620 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
221. See Rev. § 9.620(c).
222. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982).
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would instead treat any delay like that involved in Tanenbaum as going to
the question of the commercial reasonableness of the disposition.2 23
16. Burden of Proving Commercial Reasonableness Placed on Secured
Party
The burden of proving the commercial reasonableness of a disposition
is placed on the secured party if the debtor puts the secured party's com-
pliance with the rules governing disposition of collateral in issue.224 This
is consistent with the ruling by the Texas Supreme Court in Greathouse v.
Charter National Bank-Southwest,225 and will not effect a significant
change in Texas law as it currently exists.
17. Consumer Secured Transactions Defined; More Information After
Default Required in Consumer Cases
Consumer secured transactions are defined as transactions in which
both the collateral and the secured obligation are primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes.22 6 Unlike the provisions in chapter 2A
governing leases of personal property, there is no dollar cap on consumer
secured transactions. 22 7 The Federal Trade Commission holder in due
course rule is explicitly made applicable to consumer secured transac-
tions.228 Consumer debtors are entitled to more information in the event
of default and sale of collateral.22 9
18. Extensive Transition Provisions Stated
To allow time for secured parties to learn the rules of the revised chap-
ter 9, and to protect existing security interests from invalidation because
of changes made by the revision, the new chapter 9 contains extensive
transition provisions. 230 The transition provisions govern such matters as
223. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.627 (Vernon Supp. 2000); see also
Piney Point Inv. Corp. v. Photo Design, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court held that a creditor had not elected to retain collat-
eral in satisfaction of a debt even though the creditor still had most of the collateral in its
possession some two years after repossession.
Piney Point was probably an incorrect application of Tanenbaum, 628 S.W.2d 769, when
it was decided, but the result there reached is now condoned by the revised chapter 9.
224. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.626(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
225. 851 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1992).
226. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. §§ 9.102(a)(22), (a)(23), (a)(24) (Vernon
Supp. 2000).
227. See Rev. § 2A.103(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2000) (defining a consumer lease as one in
which the total payments, excluding payments for options to renew or buy at the end of the
lease term, are less than $25,000).
228. See Rev. § 9.403(d) (Vernon Supp. 2000). The FTC holder in due course rule re-
quires that any consumer credit contract contain a notice that the holder remains subject to
any claims and defenses that the debtor could assert against the seller of the goods or
services provided under the contract. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 433.1 -.3 (1999).
229. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. §§ 9.614, 9.616 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
230. In the Official Text of the revised Code, these provisions are contained in U.C.C.
§§ 9-701 to 9-708. As enacted in Texas, the transition provisions were not included as part
of chapter 9 itself, but were adopted as §§ 3.01 -.08 of the bill enacting the revised chapter
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the continued effectiveness of currently filed financing statements, the at-
tachment of security interests to new types of collateral as of the effective
date of the revised chapter 9, and priorities between filings made under
the "old" Code and filings made under the "new" Code.23 1
9. See Act of June 18, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 3.01 -.08, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 1058.
The transition provisions appear in the "Historical and Statutory Notes" in the 2000 Sup-
plement for TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. Rev. § 9.101 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
231. A detailed analysis of the transition provisions is included on the CD-ROM re-
source disk described supra note 163.
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